Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

Frankfurt begins his essay by pointing out that that there are two different forms of desire.  There are both what he calls “first-order desires” and “second-order desires.”  First-order desires or those in which someone desires to do or not do one thing or another.  On the other hand a second-order desire is a desire that entails reflective self-evaluation.

First order desires are not exclusive to human beings and in fact animals and other creatures have desires of the first order.  However, second order desires are exclusive to human begins but not all humans beings experience second order desires.  If a human being does not have second order desires then they are not considered a person in Frankfurt’s view.  A person who does not have second order desires is then in turn considered a wanton.  This groups of wantons according to Frankfurt includes all nonhuman animals, young children, and even some adult humans.  According to Frankfurt, a wanton is not considered a person because they have no second order desires.  The wanton does not care about his will and ultimately just goes through life not caring where he or she may end up.  There is no evidence that a wanton can not rationalize, they are just not concerned with the “desirability of his desires themselves.

To prove his case, Frankfurt gives an example of two drug addicts.  One drug addict has the first-order desire to take the drug because of the addiction, but also has a second-order desire to stop taking the drug, however the addiction may be too much to overcome.  On the other hand, the second drug addict again has the first desire order to take the drug, but has no second-order desire because they are not concerned where they ultimately end up.  For the second drug addict, he is not concerned about his will and to him both option of both taking the drug and quitting the drug are equal in his mind and one does not outweigh the other so he continues to use the drug.

Although I understand where Frankfurt is coming from with his argument I don’t think we can say that someone is not a person just because they do not have a will.  That individual still has emotions and feelings and to me is still a person.

W/C:385